They went on to discuss the odds on drawing a black ball from a ceramic urn containing 500 white balls and 500 black balls, or from another urn containing an unknown number of balls, which might be all black, all white, or a mixture of the two in unknown proportions. 2 Commenting on the difference between situations where a great deal is known or almost nothing is known, Caston referred to an economist, Frank Knight, who, in the 1920s, distinguished between "risk" (randomness with knowable probabilities) and "uncertainty" (randomness with unknowable probabilities). 3 It struck me that this discussion was very relevant to the inescapable problems resulting from current attitudes and practices related to establishing the safety of chemicals, pharmaceuticals and other products, where quantitative risk assessments are all-too-often founded on data of uncer-tain reliability, derived from animal tests with dubious and scientifically unsubstantiated relevance to risk to humans.
On returning home, I looked up Frank Knight and the consequences of his work on the Internet. I found him referred to as one of the 20th century's "most eclectic economists and perhaps the deepest thinker and scholar American economics has produced". 4 I discovered that risk and uncertainty had not previously been formally incorporated into economic theory, and that Knight's now famous distinction affected many distinguished economists, though not without considerable controversy about whether "Knightian risk and uncertainty are one and the same thing" or whether "Knight's distinction is crucial". 5 I must admit that I gave up when I got involved in the detailed mathematics of the St Petersburg Paradox (first presented by Daniel Bernoulli in 1738) and John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's "expected utility theorem" of 1944, 6 whereupon I turned to one of my two economist sons for advice. He referred me to some thought-provoking remarks on Monetary Policy under Uncertainty, made by Alan Greenspan, then Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on 29 August 2003. 7 One particular paragraph stood out:
In implementing a risk-management approach to policy, we must confront the fact that only a limited number of risks can be quantified with any confidence. And even these risks are generally quantifiable only if we accept the assumption that the future will replicate the past. Other risks are essentially unquantifiable -representing Knightian uncertainty, if you will -because we may not fully appreciate even the full range of possibilities, let alone each possibility's likelihood. As a result, risk management often involves significant judgment on the part of policymakers, as we evaluate the risks of different events and the probability that our actions will alter those risks.
My question is whether those responsible for regulatory toxicology and its application are sufficiently aware of the limitations which frustrate rational and reliable quantitative risk assessments, and whether they are qualified to make the necessary decisions concerning chemical or product safety. The evidence before us is not comforting, especially
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On Facing Up to Risk and Uncertainty in Relation to Animal and Non-animal Safety Testing in relation to the forthcoming application of the EU REACH system for new and existing chemicals, where, for example, up to 30,000 chemicals may have to be tested in tens of millions of animals, up to 70% of which may be used in reproductive toxicology tests which provide data of limited predictive value for humans. 8, 9 Risk assessment, the product of hazard and exposure, is routinely quantified and used as a basis for policy. However, if the underlying predictions of hazard and estimations of exposure are not of sufficiently high quality and/or relevance to the target species, the risk assessment itself is not reliable, and policies based on it will inevitably be unreliable, and even dangerous.
Two of the biggest problems in basing risk assessment for humans on data from animal tests are species differences in susceptibility and/or response, and high, short-term dosing in relation to low dose, long-term exposure. As a result, adjustment factors (perhaps more appropriately called uncertainty factors) are applied by dividing the no observable adverse effect level (NOAEL) in the animal test by 10 × 10 (i.e. 100), in order to define a NOAEL for humans (10-fold to allow for uncertainty due to species differences multiplied by 10-fold to allow for uncertainty of the relevance of animal test dose to likely human exposure). This is an approach, which purports to take account of "known unknowns" (i.e. guardedly quantifiable Knightian "risks") and, in the language of Greenspan, tends to assume "that the future will replicate the past". In reality, of course, the conventional approach fails to give sufficient recognition to "unknown unknowns" (i.e. definitely non-quantifiable Knightian "uncertainties"). The conservatism of the current approach aims to afford greater protection to humans by assuming greater susceptibility and avoiding the consequences of underestimation of risk. However, where laboratory animals are much more susceptible to the effects of a chemical than humans (if only this were known), the result may be discontinuation of the production and distribution of a very useful and beneficial substance.
The question of species differences is currently being brought sharply into focus by the increasing problem of the withdrawal of new drugs during clinical trials as a result of serious side-effects not identified during preclinical testing. The discordance between the effects seen in animal experiments and in clinical trials may be because the design of the animal studies is often inadequate, 10 as those who promote the continued reliance of drug development on animal testing will undoubtedly claim. However, there is much more to it than that.
One of the criticisms of in vitro tests is that they lack the capacity to reveal the effects of the biotransformation of chemicals, which can readily be detected in experiments on laboratory animals. However, the Founder of GenPharmTox, Johannes Doehmer, and his colleagues have established a battery of V79 Chinese hamster cell lines which contain and express the main enzymes involved in biotransformation. By cloning genes from various species, including humans, they have made possible species-species comparisons and the production of results of immediate predictive value for humans.
Doehmer gave two striking examples of the importance of species differences in his excellent 2006 FRAME Annual Lecture (included in this issue of ATLA 11 ). In one case, human cytochrome P40 (CYP) 1A1 was found to be more specific for a critical site on the benzo[a]pyrene molecule than the equivalent CYP in rats, with the result that data from experiments on rats would significantly underestimate the cancer risk to humans from exposure to the chemical. However, when a V79 cell line was constructed for the expression of human CYP1A2 and N-acetyltransferase (NAT), it was found that 2-aminfluorene was metabolised first by the NAT and then by the CYP1A1, resulting in the formation of a stable, acetylated compound, which causes no toxicity since it is readily excretable. In rat experiments, it was found that 2-aminofluorene was first metabolised by CYP1A1 and then by NAT, resulting in a highly reactive de-acetylated compound which causes cancer. Thus, in this case, reliance on the animal data would significantly overestimate the risk to humans.
The FRAME workshop on risk assessment (also published in this issue of ATLA 12 ) argues that new approaches to risk assessment are needed, to take advantage of the more-modern approaches to hazard prediction offered by new in silico and in vitro technologies, including the possibility of using human cells and tissues in culture, and to take account of "unknown unknowns". What we must not do is to use non-animal procedures to produce results directly equivalent to what the regulators are familiar with from animal tests. In particular, the biosystems used, be they in vitro or in silico models, must be derived from humans or from knowledge of human physiology, pharmacology and toxicology, and they must be based on rational, and therefore believable and applicable, evaluations of likely human exposure.
All this is achievable, if we are good enough, and courageous enough, to achieve it, but it will not be easy. There will be many pitfalls, including those involved in validating non-animal tests and testing strategies which will provide information of great value, but will not directly match or eventually replace animal test procedures, as is discussed in an ECVAM workshop report on weight-of-evidence approaches to validation, contained in this ATLA issue. 13 It is particularly important that new approaches to risk assessment are based on methodologies and practices which have been independently established to be truly relevant and reliable, and not based on that particularly dangerous and seductive perception, plausibility, or on the equally unjustified excuse of accepted custom and practice.
We must not make the same mistakes as those which led to the current over-reliance on animal experimentation in basic research, as well as in pharmacology and toxicology. William Russell and Rex Burch 14 warned of the high-fidelity fallacy, which leads to the assumption that mammals, and particularly non-human primates, are more like humans than other animals, and are therefore the best models of humans. However, where there is a substantial difference between the model and what is being modeled, e.g. the level or activity of a particular CYP, the model will, at best, be useless, and possibly even dangerously misleading. Russell and Burch also raised another very interesting point: the levels at which the high-fidelity fallacy operates. However much experimental scientists may seek to qualify the relevance and reliability of their data, once results are summarised, interpreted, then absorbed into the overall process, it is all too easy for them to be accepted without question, when, in truth, their reliability and relevance is illusory. It is the administrators, regulators, lawyers and politicians who are particularly susceptible to succumbing to the high-fidelity fallacy. They should be encouraged to read The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique, since it cannot be acceptable to take decisions and make policies on the basis of what appears to be knowable, but is, in reality, un-knowable.
As Caleb Norris put it in The Ambler Warning, "It's a matter of knowing what you don't know. My worry is that we're in a situation where we don't even know how much we don't know". 
Michael Balls

